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 Since Immanuel Kant assigned the concept a central role in his moral philosophy, 
dignity has become, according to Arthur Schopenhauer, “the shibboleth of all the 
perplexed and empty-headed moralists who concealed behind that imposing expression 
their lack of any real basis of morals, or, at any rate, of one that had any meaning.”1 
Schopenhauer has not been alone in his skepticism, and indeed his contempt, for the idea 
of dignity. Ruth Macklin, a medical ethicist, has recently argued that the concept is 
useless. Appeals to dignity, she suggests, “are either vague restatements of other, more 
precise, notions or mere slogans that add nothing to an understanding of the topic.”2 And 
Steven Pinker, in an article titled “The Stupidity of Dignity,” has characterized it as “a 
squishy, subjective notion, hardly up to the heavyweight moral demands assigned to it.”3  
For better or worse, though, this purportedly vacuous, merely subjective notion 
has over the last sixty years come to play a foundational role in legal, political, and 
ethical thought, both at the national and international levels. Article 1 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, for example, begins with the claim that “all human beings 
are born free and equal in dignity and rights.” Article 1 of the Basic Law for the Federal 
Republic of Germany states the foundational role of dignity even more strongly: “Human 
dignity is inviolable. To respect it and protect it is the duty of all state power.” In 
addition, dignity features prominently in the texts of the Geneva Conventions and in 
numerous other international human rights covenants.4 Courts of law make use of the 
                                                
1 Schopenhauer (1965, p. 100). 
2 Macklin (2003, p. 1419). 
3 Pinker (2008) 
4 McCrudden (2008, pp. 667-671).  
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concept in deciding cases concerning issues ranging from prohibitions on dwarf tossing 
to the policy of shooting down airplanes that have been hijacked by terrorists. And 
bioethicists frequently invoke dignity in their arguments concerning cloning, genetic 
engineering, and end-of-life medical decision making. As this small and very much 
incomplete list of examples illustrates, the stakes of the debates around dignity are very 
high; it is important that we get it right. 
In this paper, I argue that the skeptics about dignity are mistaken. Dignity is far 
from a useless or vacuous concept, and it is certainly more than a loftier sounding 
formulation for other, better defined moral values. Any argument in defense of dignity, 
though, must begin by acknowledging the truth in one of the skeptics’ core intuitions: 
Dignity is without a doubt a strange sort of value, and it is not at all easy to pin down 
what it means or what is supposed to follow from it. In what follows, I will focus 
specifically on describing the conception of dignity that has its origin in the moral 
philosophy of Immanuel Kant, since it is that conception, more than any other, that has 
been taken up in contemporary legal, political, and ethical thought, and that has been 
criticized for being conceptually incoherent.5 Following that, I will examine an anti-
Kantian argument advanced by Arthur Schopenhauer in his On the Basis of Morality. I 
take this to be one of the strongest and most straightforward arguments against the 
                                                
5 We must be careful to distinguish the Kantian conception of dignity from the explicitly social and 
political conception of dignitas that dates from the time of the Roman Republic. Traces of the latter no 
doubt persist in Kant’s conception, but nonetheless the two are importantly different. Briefly, dignitas 
referred to social rank, often as manifested in the holding of political office. Those who had dignitas in this 
sense were entitled to certain forms of respect, which were codified in the law. They were also expected to 
comport themselves in a manner that would render them worthy of the respect they were owed. This gives 
rise to an extended sense of dignity as connoting a noble, upright bearing. The social and political 
conception of dignitas is different from the Kantian conception in two very important ways. First, it is an 
explicitly hierarchical conception; it does not ground a duty of respect for persons as such. And second, a 
person can forfeit his or her dignitas by behaving in ways that fail to live up to the standard that it imposes 
on its possessors. Thus, if we do not take care to distinguish these two conceptions, we will be unable to 
avoid the conclusion that dignity really is a confused concept. 
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possibility of dignity, conceived in the Kantian manner as an absolute and 
incommensurable worth. Next, I will briefly consider some common interpretations of 
dignity, showing how they fail adequately to address Schopenhauer’s concern.  Finally, 
drawing heavily on the ontology articulated by Jean-Luc Nancy in a number of different 
works, but especially in Being Singular Plural, I will suggest an account of dignity that 
makes sense of its absoluteness and incommensurability. 
I. The Kantian Conception of Dignity 
Four characteristics of the Kantian conception of dignity are especially important 
for debates about the practical value of the concept. The first of these characteristics that I 
would like to address is dignity’s status as an absolute and incomparable value. Dignity, 
for Kant, is understood on the basis of its distinction from price, which is a relative, and 
thus comparable, value. If a thing has a price, then, it “can be replaced by something else 
as its equivalent.”6 If I deal with two things in terms of their prices—say two new pens of 
the same model—then it makes no practical difference which of the two I choose to write 
with. I do not treat each pen as having a unique value; one is quite literally as good as 
another. Or if one pen is not just as good as another, then the difference in their value can 
be measured on the same scale. One of the pens might be less prone to blotting than the 
other, for example, enabling it to perform the primary function of a pen more adequately. 
Things with price, in sum, are commensurable. The value of a being with dignity is 
qualitatively different from the values of things like pens in that it is absolute and thus 
incommensurable, “raised above all price.”7 I do not encounter a being with dignity 
                                                
6 Kant (1996a, p. 84 [4:434]). 
7 Kant (1996a, p. 84 [4:434]). 
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merely as an instance of a general kind of value; the value of each being with dignity is 
unique and irreplaceable. 
Second, this absolute and incomparable worth gives rise to an unconditional 
obligation to respect it. Kant states this point most explicitly in the Doctrine of Virtue: A 
person, i.e., a moral subject, “possesses a dignity (an absolute inner worth) by which he 
exacts respect for himself from all other rational beings in the world.”8 This duty of 
respect is expressed in the Formula of Humanity from the Groundwork of the 
Metaphysics of Morals: “So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in 
the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means.”9 
Properties like “orange” or “three-sided,” or even like “strong,” “friendly,” or “good at 
basketball” do not give rise to similar obligations of respect. In encountering those 
properties, I do not experience myself as necessitated to yield, refraining from exalting 
myself over the objects that have them.10 The orangeness of a book, for example, does 
not impose any constraint on my right to use the book however I please as a means to my 
ends. But to recognize a person as having dignity just is to experience such a constraint; 
while she may be valuable to me as a means in various respects, she is also present to me 
as an end in herself, as someone in relation to whom I must limit my self-esteem. 
A third characteristic that is definitive of the Kantian conception of dignity is that 
it is innate and inalienable.11 We do not need to do anything to earn it and we cannot do 
anything that would result in our forfeiting it. Kant expresses this point most 
straightforwardly in Section 39 the Doctrine of Virtue, where he argues that we must 
                                                
8 Kant (1996c, p. 557 [6:435]). 
9 Kant (1996a, p. 80 [4: 429]). Italics omitted. 
10 Kant (1996c, p. 569 [6: 449]). 
11 Kant (1996c, pp. 545; 558 [6:420; 6:436]). 
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never treat others with contempt. What is most remarkable in this passage is Kant’s 
insistence that we must respect the dignity of others even when they have acted in ways 
that render them unworthy of it.12 Kant’s example pertains to the punishment of 
criminals: Even though we are certainly entitled to deprive criminals of certain goods as 
punishment for their crimes, we must not go so far as to impose “disgraceful punishments 
that dishonor humanity itself (such as quartering a man, having him torn by dogs, cutting 
off his nose and ears).”13 No matter how badly he has acted, the criminal retains a dignity 
that imposes limits on others in their dealings with him. He can do nothing that would 
reduce him to the status of a moral non-entity, undeserving of the basic respect we owe to 
human beings in general. 
This point about the inalienability of dignity sheds some more light on the 
distinction between price and dignity. Although treating others with contempt is always 
contrary to duty, Kant argues that, in some cases at least, we cannot help “looking down 
on some in comparison with others.”14 To look down on some in comparison with others 
is to evaluate them in terms of their price, or relative value. If I discover in a person the 
habit of pursuing his own interest by all means available to him, including by lying and 
theft, then I will form a sharply critical judgment of him. If I were looking to hire 
someone to repair my car, I would certainly put him near the bottom of my list, preferring 
mechanics who are not liars and thieves. In judging him with reference to his price—his 
value relative to my desire to have my car repaired well and at a reasonable cost—I do 
him no wrong. All of us have relative value, and we cannot help treating each other 
accordingly. The point about the inalienability of dignity, though, is that we must never 
                                                
12 Kant (1996c, p. 580 [6:463]). 
13 Kant (1996c, p. 580 [6:463]). 
14 Kant (1996c, pp. 579-580 [6:463]). Italics omitted. 
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treat others as if their whole value were relative. Even those whose price is zero, or less 
than zero, have dignity; we must always treat them, in John Rawls’s well-known 
formulation, as “self-originating sources of valid claims.”15 
The fourth and final characteristic of Kantian dignity that I would like to address 
seems to be completely at odds with its supposed innateness and inalienability. In many 
passages throughout his ethical works, Kant suggests that we have only a tenuous hold on 
our dignity and that we must take great care not to let ourselves be deprived of it. A 
person who lies, for example, “throws away and, as it were, annihilates his dignity as a 
human being.”16 We can also disavow our own dignity by lowering ourselves in relation 
to others, for example by being a lackey, a flatterer, or a beggar, by accepting favors we 
can do without, and by prostrating ourselves.17 By doing these sorts of things, Kant 
suggests, we make ourselves contemptible: A person “who makes himself a worm cannot 
complain afterwards if people step on him.”18 Insofar as we disavow our own dignity, in 
other words, it seems as if we reduce ourselves to the level of non-human animals, or 
even mere things, forfeiting our moral claim to be treated by others in accordance with 
the Formula of Humanity. 
The conception of dignity outlined here gives rise to some very difficult 
theoretical problems. The first set of problems pertains to the characterization of dignity 
as absolute and incommensurable value. What can it mean to describe a value this way? 
Does it make any sense at all to speak of a value that cannot be thought as greater or 
lesser than other values? That is to say, does it make sense to think of value without any 
                                                
15 Rawls (1980, p. 543). 
16 Kant (1996c, pp. 552-553 [6:429]). 
17 Kant (1996c, p. 558 [6:436]). 
18 Kant (1996c, p. 559 [6:437]). 
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reference to a common measure? And closely related to these questions, does it really 
make sense to speak of a value that would not be a value relative to some end or relative 
to someone who had an interest in that value? The second major difficulty is to explain 
how dignity gives rise to obligations in a way that properties like “orange” and “three-
sided” do not. How can it happen that the mere recognition of a property unconditionally 
necessitates the will of a rational being to respect it? And finally, how can dignity be both 
inalienable—the kind of thing we need not earn and that we cannot even in principle 
forfeit—and also something so tenuous, requiring great care lest people be deprived of it? 
Steven Pinker raised exactly this kind of concern in “The Stupidity of Dignity:” In the 
report of the President’s Council on Bioethics, titled Human Dignity and Bioethics, we 
“read that dignity reflects excellence, striving, and conscience, so that only some people 
achieve it by dint of effort and character. We also read that everyone, no matter how lazy, 
evil, or mentally impaired, has dignity in full measure.”19 How can both of these claims 
be true? A successful defense of dignity must be able to provide answers to each of these 
questions. Before providing such a defense, though, I would like to examine in more 
detail some of the most powerful arguments against the practical value of dignity. 
II. Incommensurable Value as Contradictio in Adjecto: Schopenhauer’s Critique 
According to Arthur Schopenhauer, to describe dignity as an absolute value is like 
describing a man as an uncle-in-himself: it is a contradictio in adjecto.20 Value, in other 
words, can make sense only as a relative concept. Suppose, for example, that I own a car 
                                                
19 Pinker (2008). I believe Pinker is responding here to a real confusion in the bioethics literature, where 
Kantian conceptions of dignity can often be found mixed together with the ancient Roman conception. The 
latter, with its emphasis on noble bearing, is especially evident in the work of Leon R. Kass, who served as 
chairman of the President’s Council on Bioethics, and who famously decried the indignity of licking ice 
cream cones, which he characterized as a “catlike activity that has been made acceptable in informal 
America but that still offends those who know why eating in public is offensive.” Kass (1999, p. 148), 
quoted in Pinker (2008). 
20 Schopenhauer (1965, p. 95). 
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dealership and I want to evaluate the value of one of my salespersons. There are only two 
ways I can do that. First, I can evaluate her in comparison with the other salespersons I 
employ or could employ. And second, I can think of her value to me: My goal is to make 
as much money as I can selling cars, and she contributes in some way, well or badly, to 
that end. “Outside of these two relations,” Schopenhauer writes, “the concept worth loses 
all meaning; this is so clear that there is no need for further discussion.”21 
 I believe Schopenhauer’s contention agrees well with at least some of our 
intuitions about the nature of value. If I describe someone as having a particular value, 
my interlocutor, it seems, would always be justified in asking the follow up question, “in 
respect of what?” The answer I give to that question will always refer, it seems, to some 
kind of measure relative to which different values can be compared. If I say a person has 
a high value as a shortstop, for example, then I am committed to claims about his value 
relative to other shortstops and relative to the project of winning baseball games. If, on 
the other hand, I answer the question, “in respect of what?” by saying “in respect of 
nothing in particular,” then my interlocutor would most likely believe either that I had 
misunderstood the question or that I was being willfully evasive. If this is right, then the 
attribution of dignity as absolute value must either be understood as a rhetorical flourish, 
a kind of “hollow hyperbole,” or else as the product of a muddled thinking that has failed 
to conceive clearly the measure of value it had been employing.22 
 If Schopenhauer’s argument about the conceptual incoherence of 
incommensurable value is correct, then the other characteristics of Kantian dignity are in 
trouble as well. First, if all value is necessarily relative, then it cannot be innate and 
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inalienable. To return to a previous example, if an employee of mine has high value as a 
salesperson, that means that she compares well to other salespersons, both actual and 
potential, and that she successfully promotes my end of making money. In this case, the 
salesperson has obviously had to earn the value she has: I only employ her and judge her 
favorably on the basis of her demonstrated abilities. Moreover, she can lose her value in a 
couple of different ways. First, her skills might deteriorate enough to affect her ability to 
sell cars. If her skills deteriorate to the point where she cannot sell at all, then her value as 
a salesperson would drop to zero. (I might even regard her value as less than zero, since I 
would be paying her and receiving no benefit in return.) But secondly, even if her skills 
do not deteriorate, she can lose her value if I hire some new salespersons who sell more 
than she does. If all value is relative, as Schopenhauer’s argument suggests, then her 
value as a person would have to be understood in just the same way as her value as a 
salesperson. And if this is the case, then it is difficult to see how her value could give rise 
to an unconditional obligation of respect. If the value of persons is relative value, just like 
the value of things, then it seems that any imperatives governing my conduct with regard 
to them would be merely hypothetical. As a rational being, for example, I would be 
necessitated to take good care of a top of the line accordion that had come into my 
possession only on condition that the accordion was valuable to me, perhaps because of 
my appreciation for well made accordions or because I foresee the possibility of selling it 
at a profit. Likewise, I would be necessitated to treat another person with respect only on 
condition that she have a value of the kind that I happen to find important. 
 Is there any way, in light of these Schopenhauerian objections, to make 
conceptual sense of dignity as an absolute, incommensurable value? One possible 
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response to Schopenhauer’s challenge would be to bite the bullet, acknowledging that we 
cannot provide a coherent justification for our commitment to the phenomenon. This 
acknowledgement would not have to entail Macklin’s conclusion that dignity is a morally 
useless concept. We might, rather, want to borrow a strategy that Kant himself employed 
in arguing for the genuine bindingness of the moral law in general. In the first two 
sections of the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant develops a determination 
of the moral law on the basis of our pre-philosophical, everyday moral cognition. He 
argues that there are certain concepts, such as good will, moral worth, and duty, that are 
simply part of our moral common sense. To determine the formula of the moral law, all 
we need to do is unpack the meaning of those concepts. But throughout these sections, 
Kant keeps open the possibility that our moral common sense is fundamentally mistaken, 
that our concepts of duty and moral worth are “empty delusion[s]” and “chimerical 
idea[s] without any truth.”23 It may be the case, in other words, that we have the 
subjective experience of ourselves as unconditionally obligated, but that the experience 
lacks objective validity. In the third section of the Groundwork, then, Kant provides a 
deduction that is designed to show that the moral law really is objectively valid. 
Unfortunately, the argument fails. In the Critique of Practical Reason, then, Kant 
advances an entirely new argument for the objective validity of the moral law. There he 
insists that “the moral law cannot be proved by any deduction.”24 The validity of the law, 
rather, is given a priori as “the sole fact of pure reason.”25 This fact is absolutely basic, as 
we “cannot reason it out from antecedent data of reason.”26 Perhaps dignity as absolute, 
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24 Kant (1996b, p. 178 [5:47]).  
25 Kant (1996b, p. 165 [5:31]). 
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inner worth is just a fact in this sense, admitting of no further explanation. Teresa 
Iglesias, in her paper “Bedrock Truths and the Dignity of the Individual,” makes an 
argument of this kind. That persons have an inner, inalienable worth is a bedrock truth, 
the kind of truth that grounds moral experience in general and is thus unprovable in terms 
of anything more basic.27 On this account, our inability to explain dignity’s possibility is 
not a failure, but rather a reflection of the concept’s foundational status. It is just a fact 
that “each individual is recognized as the ultimate and most precious moral good” and 
that his or her dignity cannot “be taken away, or forfeited, whatever the person may do or 
however he or she may be regarded.”28 It may indeed be the case that dignity is just a 
bedrock, unjustifiable moral truth, but this seems like a position we should only want to 
accept as a last resort. If dignity feels subjectively like a phenomenon that makes 
important moral demands on us, but nonetheless resists our attempts make conceptual 
sense of it, then we would be more justified in accepting Macklin’s conclusion that 
dignity is a vaguely conceived version of some other, more precisely worked out moral 
notion. 
 A second way of responding to Schopenhauer’s concerns about the coherence of 
dignity is to think of it as what Michael Rosen has called an “inner, transcendental 
kernel.”29 This conception has a very long history in western thought about dignity, going 
back at least to Pope Leo I. In his sermon from December 25, 451, Leo says “Wake up 
then, o friend, and acknowledge the dignity of your nature. Recall that you have been 
                                                
27 Iglesias (2001, pp. 114-116).  
28 Iglesias (2001, pp. 131-132). 
29 Rosen (2012, p. 9). 
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made ‘according to the image of God.’”30 This idea of human dignity as grounded in the 
imago dei was developed by later Christian thinkers, including most prominently Pope 
Innocent III, Roger de Caen, and Bernard of Cluny, in a strongly dualistic direction. 
These thinkers understood human dignity as pertaining exclusively to the soul, which 
they conceived in sharp distinction from the body. The body was understood as base, as 
the locus of concupiscence, while the soul was understood as the locus of a higher, 
qualitatively different kind of value.31 Because we are embodied beings, we are tempted 
to place great value in the world, in “the lust of the flesh, and the lust of the eyes, and the 
pride of life.”32 But as beings created in the image of God, we are in possession of a value 
incomparably higher than these ephemeral and ignoble values; we debase our own 
dignity even to concern ourselves with them. But if we are tempted to focus our attention 
on worldly goods, despite the inappropriateness of our doing so, this is because our own 
value as images of God is utterly incommensurable with the worldly goods that make 
such strong impressions on our senses. Unlike the “superficial” and easily recognizable 
values of the world, our own dignity is deeply concealed in a kind of ontological interior. 
By thinking of dignity in this way as “inner,” this tradition of thought seems to place it 
outside the reach of an instrumental reason that would measure value solely with 
reference to worldly ends. As opposed to what is superficial, “inner” connotes something 
more profound and more genuine, but also something mysterious and perhaps even 
sacred. At any rate, it suggests that the worth in question is qualitatively different from 
other kinds. In addition, by thinking of dignity as inner in this way, the imago dei 
                                                
30 Saint Leo the Great (1996, p. 114). Leo’s reference here is to Genesis 1:26: “Then God said, ‘Let Us 
make man in Our image, according to Our likeness.’” 
31 Bultot (1961, p. 450). 
32 1 John 2:16. 
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tradition conceives it as utterly proper to the one who has it. This conception thus 
supports the Kantian idea that one need not earn dignity and that one cannot do anything 
to forfeit it. 
 Does this conception of dignity as inner, transcendental kernel provide an 
adequate response to Schopenhauer’s worry? Schopenhauer’s argument has as its 
foundation a claim about how worth becomes manifest in our experience. Just as three-
dimensional objects can only be co-given along with their internal and external horizons, 
so worth can only be co-given along with its context of comparison. From this it follows 
that no worth is absolute and incommensurable. Does the characterization of dignity as a 
kind of deeply concealed, divinely grounded inner worth help to shed light on how an 
absolute, incommensurable worth could be given in our experience? I do not believe so. 
Treating our dignity as grounded in our status as images of God seems rather to explain 
the obscure by the equally obscure. In characterizing our dignity as transcendent and 
mysterious, we attempt to place it outside the reach of instrumental reason. But it remains 
just as unclear how such a non-relative, non-instrumental value could actually be given in 
our experience. Our understanding of the phenomenon, then, remains exactly what it was. 
III.  Sense and Signification: Jean-Luc Nancy 
In this section, I would like to suggest the outlines of a new account of dignity, 
focusing on how something like incommensurable worth could be given in our 
experience. The account I suggest will preserve, while nonetheless modifying, the most 
important characteristics of the Kantian conception of dignity. I will attempt to show that 
dignity really is an incommensurable value and that it does give rise to unconditional 
obligations. I will also attempt to show how dignity can be given as utterly proper, more 
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our own than anything else, but at the same time as something we are vulnerable to being 
deprived of. There is one important characteristic of dignity as it has been conceived both 
in the Kantian and imago dei traditions that my account will deny, however: I will argue 
that in order successfully to account for how dignity could be given in our experience, we 
must stop thinking of it as an “inner worth.” Drawing on the ontology that Jean-Luc 
Nancy articulates in many different works, but most explicitly in Being Singular Plural, I 
want to argue that dignity should not be conceived as a kind of property somehow present 
deep inside a person, but rather as an upsurge, each time unique, of non-significant sense 
that happens right at the limits where finite, singular beings become present to each other. 
 To show that this is the case, it will be helpful to begin at the beginning, with an 
account of the mode of givenness of being itself. Nancy articulates this beginning point 
especially clearly and straightforwardly in his Hegel: The Restlessness of the Negative: 
“The given always gives itself as something other than simply given.”33 There is, in other 
words, no brute givenness of being. The given never gives itself as what Hegel in his 
Science of Logic calls “the indeterminate immediate.”34 Rather, whenever being is given, 
it is given as. The paper on which I write these words, for example, is given as white. 
There are not two discrete experiences here: the experience of brute, unqualified 
givenness and the experience of whiteness. The given is given right from the outset as 
white. And likewise, I am present to myself as someone with a particular life history, as 
someone who occupies various social roles and who is committed to different projects. 
And more generally, being itself is given as being. To conceive of the given as something 
                                                
33 Nancy (2002, p. 52).  
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separate from its “as” is to conceive of an abstraction. Such a pure given has no place 
whatever in our experience. 
 To say that being is necessarily given as is also to say that being is inseparable 
from its sense or meaning. And what follows from this insight is that our experience in 
the world is always already meaningful; we are always already in meaning. Claude Levi-
Strauss expressed this insight well when he wrote that “the universe signified long before 
we began to know what it was signifying.”35 As soon as the world is given, it gives itself 
as meaningful, even before we know exactly what its meaning is. In fact it is only 
because the world gives itself as vaguely meaningful that we strive to determine that 
meaning more precisely. Nancy expresses this same point when he writes that “there is 
no epokhe of sense, no ‘suspension’ of a ‘naïve thesis’ of sense, no ‘placing in 
parentheses’.”36 We cannot treat meaning as if it were a dubious hypothesis about which 
we must suspend our judgment. That we are in meaning cannot even in principle be 
doubted, as the very act of doubting is itself a meaningful response to a meaningful 
problem. 
This basic ontological claim points directly to a further question: How is sense 
given? According to Nancy, sense is given only as shared. It is important that we not 
misunderstand the meaning of “shared” here. Nancy does not mean to suggest that sense 
is given most originarily as a common stock of significations, shared by all the members 
of a particular community, or perhaps by human beings in general. It must not, in other 
words, be conceived as any kind of milieu.37 Sense, rather, 
                                                
35 Lévi-Strauss (1987, p. 61). 
36 Nancy (1997, p. 18).  
37 Nancy (1997, p. 5). 
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begins where presence is not pure presence but where presence comes 
apart [se disjoint] in order to be itself as such. This “as” presupposes the 
distancing, spacing, and division of presence…. Pure unshared presence—
presence to nothing, of nothing, for nothing—is neither present nor absent. 
It is the simple implosion of a being that could never have been—an 
implosion without any trace.38 
 
Pure, undivided presence, in sum, would be completely impenetrable to sense, a kind of 
black hole of meaning. If the given is meaningful, as it necessarily is, then it can only be 
given as exposed to an outside, divided from itself. How, precisely, ought we to 
understand the exposition of the given, its gesturing beyond itself toward its sense? One 
way is to conceive this exposition on the model of a circle. This model is expressed well 
in a passage from Hegel’s Lectures on Aesthetics that Nancy often quotes: “’Sense’ is this 
wonderful word that is used in two opposite meanings. On the one hand it means the 
organ of immediate apprehension, but on the other hand we mean by it the sense, the 
meaning, the thought, the universal underlying the thing.”39 Hegel is speaking here of the 
German word Sinn, which names both the sensible intuition of the given and the 
universal, the intelligible meaning of the given. Sinn thus names the givenness of the 
sensible and its intelligible meaning as a single, unified phenomenon. The English term 
“sense” functions in the same way, of course: We speak of the five senses as well as of 
the sense of a proposition. It is this unified phenomenon of sense that is represented in the 
form of a circle: “Ideality is ideality of sensibility, and sensibility is sensibility of 
ideality.”40 It is this circular structure of sense that Nancy means to deny. Sense is not 
contained within the circular relation of the sensible and the intelligible; in our 
meaningful being-in-the-world, we always find an “excess of sense over all appropriable 
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sense.” So, for example, it may be the case that I am a philosopher, a professor, a friend, 
a baseball fan, etc., but it is also necessarily the case that I am something more than these 
significations. And that “something more” cannot be understood as yet another 
signification. 
According to Nancy, then, sense happens in the event of a being’s exposure to an 
outside that it cannot appropriate. It is necessarily given as the being-with of beings. And 
“it is not the case that the ‘with’ is an addition to some prior Being; instead, the ‘with’ is 
at the heart of Being.”41 Beings are what they are only as “with,” as exposed to each other 
in the space of divided presence. It is this exposure that Nancy is referring to when he 
asserts that sense is given only as shared. Being cannot appropriate its sense—it cannot 
have a sense—precisely because “all sense resides in the nonappropriation of ‘being.’”42 
In this non-appropriation, we encounter a third sense of sense beyond the two whose 
correlation Hegel found expressed in that wonderful word “sense.” In The Sense of the 
World Nancy notes that “although the etymology of the word sense is not clear, one 
constant is that the word is attached to a semantic family in which one finds, first of all, 
in Irish, Gothic, or High German, the values of movement, oriented displacement, 
voyage, ‘tending toward’.”43 This third element is captured in the French word sens, 
which in addition to naming the organ of immediate apprehension and ideal meaning or 
signification, can also be used to mean “direction.” Nancy’s point is that all sense 
happens in the exposure of beings—necessarily plural—to each other. Once again, beings 
that are not exposed, not separated from themselves and oriented toward each other, 
cannot be.  
                                                
41 Nancy (2002, p. 30).  
42 Nancy (2003a, p. 9).  
43 Nancy (1997, p. 12). 
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From this it follows that meaning cannot be conceived as fully present in the 
interior of beings, but must rather be conceived as something that arises at their limits. 
Limit is conceived here as “the end, the extremity beyond which there is nothing more—
nothing more, at least, of the thing or the being of which one reaches the limit…. It is 
immediately and conjointly the strict contour of an ‘inside’ and the design or outline of 
an ‘outside.’”44 Limit, in other words, gives a kind of propriety, an interiority that would 
be the being’s own, but a propriety that is necessarily exposed to an exteriority that 
ceaselessly interrupts it. Sense happens nowhere else than at this limit where beings are 
exposed to each other. The sense that arises at the limit is not sense as signification, as 
fixed, determinate meaning. What arises is rather the very origin of meaning, the birth to 
presence that is not yet a determinate presence, a present something.45 What arises, then, 
is precisely the unbinding of the being from its proper meaning, a kind of sense without 
signification.46 
IV. Dignity and Singularity 
 The being whose proper meaning is interrupted by its exposure at the limit is what 
Nancy calls a singular. And with this notion of singularity we approach once again the 
question of dignity. The singular qua singular is not the particular, which is an instance of 
a general signification. Qua particulars, our values are entirely commensurable. As a 
particular human being, I am a professor, a philosopher, a friend, etc. When I am present 
to my students as a professor, I am present as an instance of the general kind “professor,” 
and can thus be evaluated in comparison with others of that same kind. Whatever value I 
have qua professor is necessarily relative. Insofar as we are present to each other as 
                                                
44 Nancy (2003b, pp. 103, 104). 
45 Nancy (2003a, p. 27). 
46 Nancy (2003b, p.104); Nancy (2002, p. 104). 
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particulars, then, Schopenhauer’s insight about the relativity of value is entirely correct. 
And indeed it is not false to say that I am a particular—that I am a professor, a 
philosopher, a friend, etc. But it would be false to suggest that the meanings I embody 
qua particular constitute the whole of my meaning. As a finite singular being, exposed at 
the limit to an exteriority that is never simply mine, I am more than the fixed 
significations that I instantiate: I am the site of the very emergence of meaning, and as 
such utterly incommensurable.47  
The incommensurability of the singular is reflected, Nancy thinks, in the common 
expression “people are strange.” Sense surges up, each time new and each time 
precariously, in the to of our presentation to each other. Because of this, the other to 
whom we are present is given as more than a mere token of a type: He is given as strange. 
“The other origin is incomparable or inassimilable, not because it is simply “other” but 
because it is an origin and touch of meaning.... You are absolutely strange because the 
world begins its turn with you.”48 We lack access to this incommensurable origin of sense 
not because it is concealed so deeply in the interior of the subject—whether as imago dei 
or as transcendental freedom—but because the origin is not a something. The origin 
happens as an ever-renewed creation of the world ex nihilo, and it happens right here in 
the world, right at the limit where we encounter each other.  
If dignity is given along with singularity, which is itself given as something in 
excess of what a person can make his or her own, then what can it mean to say that a 
person has dignity?  What, in other words, is the locus of that dignity?  It cannot be the 
case that a person’s dignity has its locus in the intelligible significations that state who or 
                                                
47 Nancy (2000, pp. 74-75). 
48 Nancy (2000, p. 6). 
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what that person is. One does not have dignity because of one’s being well born or 
wealthy, or even virtuous. When the dignity of an elderly, cognitively impaired resident 
in a nursing home is violated, it is not she qua grandmother, qua Catholic, qua American 
citizen, or even qua human being who is wronged. Nor, of course, is it she qua possessor 
of sensible qualities—blue eyes, for example, or a certain height. Dignity, as we have 
seen, eludes the duality of sensible and intelligible sense. It is rather she simpliciter 
whose dignity is violated. Nancy’s emphasis on a third and more basic, directional 
moment of sense gives us important resources for understanding what that can mean. For 
Nancy, a person’s dignity would be right at the person. This admittedly awkward 
locution “right at” translates the French idiom, “à même,” which Nancy uses very 
frequently. To say that dignity is right at the person is to say that it is inseparable from 
the person, as intimate as anything can possibly be, but that it is nonetheless not the 
person’s own, not his or her possession. This dignity that is right at the person is that to 
which the person is oriented and exposed, but which is itself never completely given. 
This conception of dignity as being right at the person helps to account for our 
apparently contradictory experience of dignity as something absolutely proper, uniquely 
our own, but also as something we are always in danger of losing. The meanings that 
define my life happen at my limit: My being a friend, for example, is a part of who I am 
in a very real and practically important sense, and I can only be a friend in the context of 
my exposure to others who respond to me as such. But even more basically than that, I 
am somebody—somebody who matters, someone whose projects and perspectives are 
worthy of being taken seriously—only as being-with. On the one hand, my quality of 
being somebody who matters is more intimately my own than any other; there are many 
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people who would rather die than surrender that basic dignity. On the other hand, because 
my dignity, my being a somebody, happens as an event of sense right at the limit in my 
encounters with others, I am always vulnerable to others who might relate to me as if I 
were a nobody. If this were not the case—if we were perfectly secure in our possession of 
dignity—then the duties of respect we have both for others and for ourselves would be 
superfluous. But I think it is fair to say that we do not experience those duties as 
superfluous; it matters to us a great deal whether or not we are treated in accordance with 
something like the Formula of Humanity. If we are not, we feel that we have been 
deprived not only of something very valuable, but also of something to which we can 
make a rightful claim. 
Finally, I believe that we can account for the genuine bindingness of the 
obligation to respect dignity by returning to something like the Kantian doctrine of the 
fact of reason. In this case, the relevant fact is just that there can be no epoché of sense, 
that we find ourselves exposed always already to a sense that exceeds determinate and 
appropriable sense. This sense happens, as we have seen, only at the limit where beings 
encounter one another. And as Jean-François Lyotard once remarked in a very different 
context, “nobody is the master of encounters.”49 Given the ontology of being singular 
plural, I cannot even in principle control the event of sense that happens in my relations 
with others. In being-with, rather, I experience a radical passivity right at the most 
originary level of my opening out onto the world. As strange, as origin of the sense of the 
world, the other is given to me precisely as demanding respect, as a self-originating 
source of valid claims. Indeed, the validity of the other’s claim is given to me even before 
I know what the claim is. Modifying the formulation of Lévi-Strauss, we could say that 
                                                
49 Lyotard (1993, p. 41). 
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there is an obligation of respect for the other even before we can know what that 
obligation is. And this explains the Kantian claim that being contemptuous of others “is 
in every case contrary to duty.”50 It is not for me to determine unilaterally the other’s 
value. Even if I rightly judge the person to have a low value in this or that respect, it 
remains the case that the other has a value that exceeds my determination or anyone 
else’s. 
With this, in conclusion, I hope to have shown that Schopenhauerian skepticism is 
fundamentally mistaken and that dignity is far from being a useless or stupid concept. 
Absolute and incommensurable value not only can be given in our experience, but is 
given during the course of our most ordinary, everyday engagements with the world. And 
close attention to how this value is given confirms at least the basic features of dignity as 
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